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Anticipating the behaviour of others 
based on what you think they know.
Need to represent the environment, 
and the idea that others also have 
such representations.
Adult humans can do it.  Children and primates are borderline 
cases.  Many animals can't do it.
Implicated in some big developments, i.e., language, culture, 
teamwork, self-awareness.
So: how does it evolve?  When would you want it?Previous work
Earlier ALife work has looked at 
ToM in collision-avoidance 
situations (Takano & Arita, ALife 
X, and Zanlungo's PhD thesis).  
Think of that little dance that two 
pedestrians do when trying to 
guess the other's intentions.
Interesting work, but it's strictly 
an anti-coordination game, and 
we wanted to look at more 
general conditions for ToM to 
evolve.Kinds of minds
A classification scheme borrowed from Dennett.
●Zero-order agent: purely reactive to perceptual inputs.
●1st-order agent: builds on this by including internal state that 
maps the environment, e.g., remembering where a predator 
was last seen.
●2nd-order agent: has basic ToM via a world-model that 
includes the internal states of other agents (e.g., "there's a 
predator behind that tree, but my friend hasn't seen it yet"). 
●3rd- and higher-order agents include a recursive aspect, i.
e., a model of what I think he thinks I am thinking.Pragmatic approach
ALife's individual-based simulations allow us to ask: when 
would this capacity be selected for?  In what ecological niches 
would it be favoured?
Complex cognition doesn't appear for no reason: extra brain 
functions are going to incur costs, and so there will need to be 
a benefit if a novel mutation is going to fix in the population.
We ask: in what environments will it be selectively 
advantageous to climb Dennett's ToM ladder?
The answer should be useful in figuring out what's special 
about ToM-equipped animals like ourselves.Simulation environment
Ten agents occupy a ring of 10 
abstract locations.
They can perceive their current 
location and its two neighbours.
Locations payoffs depend on the 
number of agents present, and 
are either cooperative (e.g., 
hunting) or competitive (e.g., 
splitting a limited food supply).
Thus, high payoffs are achieved 
by either coordinating or anti-
coordinating behaviour.Invasion studies
No genetic algorithm: we looked instead at a population of 
agents and asked whether a mutant that was one level up the 
scale could successfully invade.
We also looked at back-sliding: could a mutant from one level 
down invade a population of higher-order agents?
 
We explored multiple parameters (e.g., percentage of the world 
visible to one agent) but the major one was the degree of 
cooperation vs. competition in the environmental payoffs. Do 1st-order agents invade a zero-order population?Do 2nd-order agents invade a 1st-order population?Do 3rd-order agents invade a 2nd-order population?Conclusions
1st-order (representational) agents are broadly selected for.
2nd-order agents (ToM) only happen if the environment is very 
competitive, and will be in a mixed-strategy equilibrium with 1st-
order agents.
 
Machiavellian 3rd-order agents are only weakly selected for 
even in highly competitive contexts. 
Just-so stories about ToM having its origins in cooperative 
hunting look weak.  If you have lots of cooperative options 
already, there is no pressure to model the mental states of 
others as "selfish" behaviour by all will lead to good outcomes.What if the world gets bigger?
In other words, what if there are more agents, all looking at 
distinct parts of a bigger environment? 
 
To get 1st-order systems, the world needs to be bigger than 
what you can see in one go, otherwise direct perception would 
do just as well.
Being a 2nd-order system is selected for over a variety of 
intermediate population sizes / levels of perceptual overlap.
Being a 3rd-order system is not selected for very strongly once 
the population becomes large.Some parameter values
NUM_AGENTS 10
NUM_LOCATIONS 10
NUM_REPEATS 200
NUM_TIME_STEPS 2000
VIEWABLE_LOCS 3
PROB_MOVEMENT 1.0
PROB_RANDOM_JUMP 0.05
PROB_CHANGE_PAYOFF 0.02